AFRICAN EPISTEMOLOGY AS A CRITIQUE OF WESTERN EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract

Many African epistemologists consider themselves either universalists or relativists about theories of knowledge. Despite the instinctive appeal of the universalist and relativist positions, many of their advocates are at crossroads about the relevance of both positions to African philosophy. This paper considers the plausibility of both positions to see if African epistemology can be a tool to critique western epistemology.  It argues for the importance of making a distinction between the African epistemology which is more communal and western epistemology that tends to be individualistic. Also, after making the distinction between both, the paper postulates that the universalists’ position perceive knowledge as the same across all culture and make it problematic for theories of knowledge. The paper suggests that any relativist position must begin by defending the uniqueness of African epistemology on the grounds that it will employ a social epistemology that is suitable to African ways of knowing. This is one of the philosophical benefits which African epistemology offers. In concluding, it suggests that there is no reason to doubt that African knowledge systems are rational enough to critique western theories of knowledge that are Eurocentric and egocentric.