Kant’s Critique of Immediacy and Constraint to Human Knowledge Reconsidered

Abstract

Prominent in Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy is his critique of immediacy, which features his rejection of the myth of the given. For Kant, there is no given as such in sensible experience, but that which is given in experience can only be known as mediated by the subject's faculty of reason. This position yields a series of epistemic problems. Outstanding among these is that of rendering an adequate account for the finite nature of the human knowledge, without the inconsistency of reverting to the myth of the given which the Kantian critique rejects. Kant identifies the solution in the object's prior existence which is prior to and independent of the subject's knowing activity. Upon critical assessment, however, this Kantian solution appears unsatisfactory and highly nettled by epistemic inadequacies and logical inconsistencies. This paper critically examines Kant's critique on immediacy and interrogates the pitfalls in his account for the finite character of human knowledge, within the context of the critique. The significance of this work lies in its demonstration of the epistemic weaknesses in Kant's position on this issue, and pointing out ways to remedy the challenge. The expository and critical analytic methods of philosophical inquiry are adopted.