This study investigates the concept of positing in the philosophical thought of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The philosopher claims that his Wissenschaftslehre (the science of knowledge) provides the requisite systematicity philosophy so desperately needs but has thus far eluded her. Although a core aspect of his system, its precise meaning remains, for the most part, is obscure. For example, in a draft of a letter to Karl Reinhold, Fichte states that positing refers to the I'sself-intuition without acquainting his readers with its precise meaning, thereby forcing them to turn to other aspects of his theory for its import. Amidst the philosophical and scholarly discourse generated by attempts to come to gain an understanding of this aspect of Fichte's thought, this paper defends the view that in his early Jena period, Fichte uses the technical term 'positing' to contribute to a theory of self-consciousness; roughly the notion of the subject's awareness of its awareness of its status also as the object of cognition.